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THE LAW OF TITLE INSURANCE
L. A.

PELKEY

T

HE business of insuring titles to property has had but a comparatively recent origin, for until 1874 there existed no legislative recognition, at least, of the existence of or need for this type of
insurance. In that year a law was enacted in Pennsylvania defining
and enumerating the powers of corporations which would be organized for the purpose of searching and examining titles.' However,
as early as 1853 mention was made of the "Law Property Assurance
and Trust Society," the purpose of which was the insurance of de2
fective titles and guaranteeing repayment of loans and mortgages.
The statutes of most of the states and even those of some of our
territories, either by enabling or by regulatory provisions, give evidence of the growing importance being attached to work of insuring
titles.3 Title insurance is written today practically entirely by corporations or associations having defined and limited powers and under
strict regulation by the states in which they operate.4 Their facilities
'Act of April 29, 1874, P.L. 84. See 4 Purdon's Dig. (13th ed.) 4761 §I note
f, and 7 ibid. 7676. See Penn. Stats. note 4 infra. See I Beach, Law of Ins.
§320 for text of the original act. The Real Estate Title and Trust Co., organized
in Philadelphia in 1876, has been called the pioneer company organized for this
purpose. Corporations to guarantee titles were organized in New York prior
to any special act, for in 1883, the Title Guarantee and Trust Co. was organized,
its purpose being to copy the records of real estate in the counties of New York
and Kings and to examine and guarantee titles, but not until 1885 (Laws of N.Y.
1885 Ch. 538 p. 9o5; Comp. Laws 1909 §§17o-184) was there any act regulating
such organization. See History of Title Insurance in New York and Brooklyn,
Title Guarantee & Investment Co., Lotus Press 1896, and i Joyce, Law of Ins.
(2nd ed. 1917) §IXa.
'Francis' Annals of Life Assurance, p. 291. Joyce, Law of Ins. ibid.
'Richards' Ins. Law (3rd ed.) §§466, 467.
'Where no statutes covering the subject have been found the name of the
state has been omitted. Most of the statutes here mentioned are regulatory:
Alabama, §§7087-7o95 Code of Ala. 1923. Act of Sept. 29, 1923; Arizona, §§3423
(ii)
and 347o R-S. of Ariz. 1913; Arkansas, Ch. III §27 (8) Dig. Ins. Laws

of Ark., or §1 (8) Act of March 25, 1921; California, §§594 and 6o2 Pol. Code,
§§453s-453z Civ. Code, and §339 Code Civ. Proc. Cf. §594 Pol. C. and
§453 Civ. C.; Florida, §4185 (14) Rev. Gen'l Stats. of Fla. 1920; Hawaii, Territory, §§3417 (7), 3418 Stats. of Hawaii; Georgia, §2817 (14) Parks Anno. Code
of Ga. (Vol. 8, 1922 suppl.), or Acts of 1917 pp. 56 and 61; Idaho, §4858 (I)
Comp. Stats. of Ida. 1919, or §2961 (I) Rev. Code 19o8; Illinois, Ch. 32 §§364 to
374 R.S. Ill. 1921 p. 966, or §§2578 to 2588 Ill. Stats. Anno. 1913; Indiana, §4874
Burns Anno. Ind. Stats. 1926 under topic of Voluntary Associations; Kansas, Art.
18 §17-18Ol and Art. 20 §17-2002(7) R.S. of Kan. 1923; Kentucky, §§687 and
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are becoming so great, due to their extensive and multiplied examinations of titles that it is becoming more and more difficult for the
individual attorney to compete with them in this branch of legal work.5
Thus it should be of interest, to lawyers, at least, to know the extent
of protection6 these companies actually afford their clients, and the
duties and responsibilities imposed upon them by the courts., Generally
these companies combine the business of conveyancing, abstracting and
the examination of titles with that of insuring titles, and hence, in
determining the liability, in any given case, of a company doing such
a combined business, it devolves upon the attorney to determine in
the first instance the nature of the contract upon which suit is brought,
and the capacity in which such company was acting when it made
such contract.
In matters of abstracting and conveyancing such companies bear no
different relationship nor do they owe a greater duty or responsibility
883c-I to 883c-3 Ky. Stats. 1922; Maine, Ch. 53 §§I45 to 155 p. 887 et seq. R.S. Me.
1916; Massachusetts §§47 (II), 48, 114 and 116 of Ch. 175, and §§46 and 47 of Ch.
221, of Gen'l Laws of Mass. 1921; Michigan, §9100 (30),
1922 Suppl. to Comp.
Laws of Mich. 1915; 3Uinnesota,§§3315(7) and 3703 to 3709 Gen'l Stats. of Minn.
1923; Missouri, §ii8oo R.S. Mo. 1919, this is a dis-enabling statute preventing trust
companies not doing a title insurance business at the time of the passage of the act
(Laws of MIo. 1915) from thereafter exercising that privilege; Montana, §§6345 to
6354 R.S. Mont. 1921; Nebraska, §7814(11) Comp. Stats. Neb. 1922; Nevada, §§i
to 12 Ch. 57 PP. 90 to 94 Stats. Nev. 1925; New Hampshire, Ch. 120 §2 N.H. Laws
1911 and Ch. 264 §2 P.L. of N.H. 1926 a dis-enabling statute to the same effect
as the Missouri statute mentioned above in this note; New Jersey, §i (VIII)
P.L. 1902, p. 407, Vol. 2 Comp. Stats. of N.J. 1911, pp. 2838 to 2839, and §§I to 6
Ch. 97 Laws 1923, §§221-47 to 221-52 Comp. Stats. of NJ. (1924 Suppl.), also
Ch. 305 Laws 1926; New Mexico, §§433(7) and 2847 N.M. Stats. Anno 1915;
New York, Ch. 28 Art. 5 Consol. Laws 1909, §§17o to 183. See N.Y. Ins. Law.
Anno. 1927 ed., Banks Law Pub. Co.. As to the sources of the various N.Y.
statutes relating to insurance see 2 Birdseye's Cum. and Gilb. Consol. Laws
of N.Y. Annot. pp. 251o et seq., and 7 ibid. (1910-1913 cum. suppl.) pp. 1297 et
seq.; North Carolina, §§6274, 6327(5), 6334(5), 6395 to 6397, and 7844 Consol.
Stats. of N.C. 1919; Ohio, 71o-168 to 710-171, and 9850 to 9855 Gen'l Code of
Ohio 1921; Oklahoma, §§311 and 34o4 R.L. 191o, and S.L. 1915 §I6 now found
in §§6666(8), 4194(7) and 6755 Comp. Stats. of Okla. 1921; Oregon, §§4681 to
4685 of Lord's Oregon Laws I91O now §§6553 to 6557 and 66oo Ore. Laws (Olson's Comp.) ; Pennsylvania, §§124o, 5560, 5598(19), 6147, 6265, 6311 to 6334,
6340 and 11082 Penna. Stats. 192o; South Dakota, §§9386 and 9389 Rev. Code of
S.D. 1919; Utah, §§12ol to 1207 Comp. Laws of Utah, 1917; Vermont, §5598 Gen'l
Laws of Vt. 1917; Virginia, §4 148i Gen'l Laws of Va. 1923. Cf. §43o5; WashingtoM, §§7128(12), 7129(4) and 7250 to 7258 Remington's Comp. Stats. of Wash.
1922; West Virginia, Ch. 54 §8Ia (5)
p. 12o4 and Ch. 54C §9(1) et seq. p. 1242
of W.Va. Code Anno. 1923; Wisconsin, §§18o.19 to 180.20 Wis. Stats. 1925 now
renumbered §§212.Ol to 212.03 Wis. Stats. 1927 by Ch. 212 Laws 1927.
'Richards' Ins. Law (3rd ed.) §467.

'See infra note

42.
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to their clients than do individuals engaged in that work.7 Their liability when acting in the capacity of insurers of titles is in no event
affected by their liability as conveyancei-s, for the contracts under
which they may be held liable as abstracters or examiners of titles
are of an entirely different nature than those wherein they engage
to insure title in an owner; for in the performance of the latter contracts the doctrine of skill and care have no application, and the question
of negligence in the discovery of defects in title cannot arise. The
guarantee is absolute, subject only to the conditions of the policy.8
In this connection it may be well to state that, aside from his duty
to avoid any breach of confidence between himself and his client,9 the
examiner or abstracter of titles is not liable except for negligence or
want of necessary skill and knowledge.' 0 He does not warrant the
titles he has examined or abstracted, nor is he a guarantor as to their
perfection. The contract made by him when he examines or drafts
the abstract of title is not one of indemnity, but a contract that he
'Ehiner v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co. (1898) 156 N.Y. io, 50 N.E. 42o,
wherein the court remarked: "The obligations and duties that the parties assumed
toward each other were therefore similar in all respects to those growing out of
the relation of attorney and client in transactions of the same character, and
hence the case must be determined upon the same principles." See Glyn v. Title
Guarantee and Trust Co. (igog) 117 N.Y. Supp. 424, 132 App. Div. 859 upon the
point of relation of attorney and client. See Whitaker v. Title Ins. and Trust Co.
(1921) 186 Cal. 432, igg Pac. 528; also Economy Bldg., and Loan Assn. v. West
Jersey Title and Guaranty Co. (I8g), 64 N.J.L. 27, 44 Atl. 854, where it was
held that the averment that defendant "carelessly omitted to certify to a previous
incumbrance" established a complete right of action on the contract. See note
12 infra.

'Trenton Potteries Co. v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co. (1900), 50 App. Div.
49o, 64 N.Y. Supp. ii6, 117, citing Byrnes v. Palmer (i897) i8 App. Div. i, 45

N.Y. Supp. 479, and Ehmer v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., supra. The Ehmer
case mentions a policy of title insurance given by the defendant company to the
plaintiff, but the recovery was based wholly upon the negligence of one of the
defendant's agents in making a mis-description of the property, and the court,
though the policy is mentioned, disregards it in determining the defendant's liability.
Vallette v. Tedens (1897), 12 Ill. 607, 14 N.E. 52, 3 Am. St. Rep. 502.
"0Of course, the loss suffered must be occasioned by reason of the defective
abstract, or the abstractor cannot be charged with any liability. Thomas v. Carson
(1896) 46 Nebr. 765, 65 N.Y. 899. See Crook v. Chilvers (I916), 90 Nebr. 684,
157 N.W. 617, Ann. Cas. igi8 E., 90, and the note p. 94. Also, since negligence is
the ground of the liability of an abstractor, it follows that contributory negligence
on the part of his client will defeat a recovery against him. Roberts v. Sterling
(1887) 4 Mo. App. 593; Roberts v. Leon Loan and Abstract Co. (1884) 63 Ia.
76, i8 N.W. 7o2, again found in 69 Iowa 673, 29 N.W. 776. See also, Davis v.
Steeps (1894), 87 Wis. 472, 58 N.W. 769, 23 L.R.A. 818, 41 Am. St. Rep. 51.
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will skillfully do the work he contracts to do." And ordinarily an
examiner is liable only to the person employing him for any want of
skill or diligence in the preparation of an abstract or certificate of title,
and not to a third person who acts or relies on his certificate. 12 His
liability though it may be based on negligence is essentially contractual 3
4
and there must be privity of contract to create liability.'

Just what the purpose and nature of title insurance is can be readily
perceived from a quotation from the leading case of Foehrenbach v.
German-American Title & Trust Co., per Potter

J_:' s

"The sole ob-

ject of title insurance is to cover possibilities of loss through defects
that may cloud or invalidate titles. It is for the assumption of whatever risk there may be in such connection, that the premium is paid
to, and accepted by, the company which issues the policy. Title insurance is not mere guess work, nor is it a wager.' 6 It is based upon
careful examination of the muniments of title and the exercise of judgWacek v. Frink (1892)

Walker v. Bownan

(191o)

5, Minn. 282, 53 N.W. 6 33, 38 Am. St. Rep. 502;
Okla. 172, IIi Pac. 319, Ann. Cas. I912B, 839, 30

:27

L.R.A. (NS) 642.
"Zweigert v. Birdseye (1894) 57 Mo. App. 462; Tlonas v. Guarantee Title
and Trust Co. (191o) 81 Oh. St. 432, gi N.E. 183, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.)
I22, and
note. See also, Gallegos v. Ortiz (1923) 28 N.M. 598, 216 Pac. 5o2. But see,
Brown v. Sims (1899) 22 Ind. App. 317, 53 N.E. 779, 72 Am. St. Rep. 3o8, and
Dickle v. Nashville Abstract Co. (i8go) 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S.W. 896, 24 Am. St.
Rep. 616.
The case of Economy Bldg and Loan Assu. v. West Jersey Title Guaranty Co.
(1899), 64 N.J.L. 27, 44 Ati. 854, is illustrative of an exception to the general
rule stated. In that case the defendant searched and certified as to the title of one
of its clients and delivered its certificate to be used for the purpose of obtaining
a loan from the plaintiff, and upon its strength the loan was duly made. In the
suit that followed, the defendant contended that there was no privity shown between it and the plaintiff. The court held, however, that defendant was liable
either upon the doctrine that there was a contract established through the agency
of the borrower, or upon the ground that the contract between the defendant and
the borrower was one for the benefit of the plaintiff upon which he had a right
to sue.
"Equitable Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Bank of Conmmerce and Trust Co. (19o7)
118 Tenn. 678, 102 S.W. 901, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 449 and note, 12 Ann. Cas. 407,
and notd. And the extent of his undertaking is to be determined from the contract or from the certificate which he appends to the abstract. Crook v. Chilvcrs
(1916) 9o Nebr. 6S4, 157 N.W. 617, Ann. Cas. IgI8E, 9o. In this connection see
also, Whlitaker v. Title Ins. and Truest Co. (1921) 186 Cal. 432, 199 Pac. 528.
" National Savings Bank v. Ward (1879) 100 U.S. 195, 25 L.ed. 621 ; Kenyon v.
Charlevoix Improvement Co. (1903) 135 Mich. 103, 97 N.W. 407; Equitable Bldg.
and Loan Assn. v. Bank of Commerce and Trust Co. note 13 supra.
S(1907) 217 Pa. St. 331, 336-337, 66 Atl. 551, 553, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 465, 118
Am. St. Rep. g16.
To the same effect see Empire Development Co. v. Title Guarantee and Trust
Co. (1918) 225 N.Y. 53, 121 N.E. 468.
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policy of title insurance
ment by skilled conveyancers..... .A
means the opinion of the company which issues it, as to the validity
of the title, backed by an agreement to make that opinion good, in
case it should prove to be mistaken, and loss should result in consequence to the insured."" This protection mentioned does not relate
to matters that may arise during a specified term after the policy
is issued, for the risks of title insurance end where those of other
kinds begin. Insurance of this kind is designed to protect an insured
owner or mortgagee from any loss through defects, liens, or incumbrances that may affect or burden his title at the time the policy is
issued. It does not protect against any claim arising after the issuance of the policy."' It follows then, as a general rule, that when the
insured gets a good title the covenant of the insurer has been fulfilled,
and there is no liability. 19
Though Cooley in his work on insurance 0 gives perhaps the most
simple definition of title insurance, yet, for completeness and accuracy, that of Joyce 2 1 is undoubtedly the best. He defines it as "A
contract whereby one agrees for a consideration to guarantee or protect another's title to* real estate, 22 or which insures against all loss or
damage, not in excess of a specified sum, which assured may sustain
by reason of existing defects or unmarketableness of title to a described estate, mortgage, or interest, or because of liens and incum" Nor is the insurer a surety. Minnesota Title Ins. and Trust Co. v. Drexel
(1895) 36 U.S. App. 50, 17 C.C.A. 56, 70 Fed. 194. This is important for in some
States, laws applicable to surety companies do not apply to guaranty and indemnity
companies. See note to §2 7 i, Joyce, Law of Ins. (2nd ed. 1917). See note 31,
infra.
s See note 23 infra. See Wheeler v. Real Estate Title Ins. and Trust Co.
(894) 16o Pa. St. 408, 28 Atl. 849 discussed infra. Such a policy guarantees only
the record title where it excepts from its terms the "tenure" of the present occupants, and liens and incumbrances, judicial proceedings, etc., not shown by any
public record. Bothin v. Calif. Title Ins. and Trust Co. (29o8) 153 Cal. 718, 96
Pac. 500; nor does it protect against defects or objections created by the act or
privity of the insured himself, Rosenblatt v. Louisville Title Co. (1927) 218 Ky.

714,

292 S.W.

333.

" Trenton Potteries Co. v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co. (1903) 276 N.Y. 65,
68 N.E. 132, 134, per Werner J., and Foehrenbach v. German-American Title and
Trust Co., supra, note 15, per Potter J.
20
Cooley, Briefs on Ins. (2905) p. 22. Frost's definition as set forth in his
work on Guaranty Ins. §162, is somewhat more detailed than Cooley's but cannot
compare favorably with Joyce's set forth above. 61 Cal. App. 232, 214 Pac. 667.
'Joyce, Law of Ins. (2nd ed. 1917) §13, quoting Richards on Ins. (3rd ed.)
§465 and many of the cases discussed in this article, and also citing In re Hogan
(2899) 8 N.D. 301, 78 N.W. 1052, 45 L.R.A. 166, 73 Am. St. Rep. 759, 28 Ins.
Law. J. 520.
'§594(4) Pol. C. of California enables the insurance of personal property titles
as well as those of real property. See opinions of attorney general 4894.
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brances charging the same, as of the date of the policy, 23 with certain
exceptions; or by reason of defects in the title of a mortgagor in the
mortgaged estate, or mortgage interest." Such a policy is very much
in the nature of a covenant of warranty or of a covenant against
2 4

incumbrances.

A policy of title insurance is primarily one of indemnity for loss or
damage suffered by the insured ;25 for the insured cannot make such a
contract one of profit to him.2 6 And to recover under such a policy
a mere possibility of a future loss will not suffice. Mere proof of a
defect in a title or of unmarketability will not establish a right to recover thereunder; there must be a further showing that an actual
In
and positive loss or damage has been incurred by the insured.2
Banes v. New Jersey Title Guarantee & Trust Co. 28 the plaintiff ac-

quired a part interest in a mortgage and obtained from the defendant
a policy insuring him against any loss or damage which he might
'Since policies may, on consent of the insurer, be assigned, as an added precaution, the Chicago Title and Trust Co. in that part of its policies containing
the list of conditions and stipulations, provides that "In assenting to assignment
no liability is assumed by the company for defects or incumbrances created subsequent to the date of this policy."
"Empire Development Co. v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co. (1918) 225 N.Y.
53, 121 N.E. 468. See Barton v. West Jersey Title Guaranty Co. (1899) 64 N.J.L.
24, 44 Atl. 871.
'Joyce, Law of Ins. (2nd ed. 1917) §27i; I Cooley, Briefs an Ins. (I9O5) p.
88. Minnesota Title Ins. and Trust Co. v. Drexel (i895) 36 U.S. App. 50, 17
C.C.A. 56, 70 Fed. 194; Purcell v. Land Title Guarantee Co. (19o2), 94 Mo. App.
5, 67 S.W. 726; Wheeler v. Equitable Trust Co. (1903) 2o6 Pa. St. 428, 55 Atl.
io65; Banes v. Neze Jersey Title Guarantee and Trust Co. (igo6) 74 C.C.A. 127,
142 Fed. 957; Pallister v. Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. (i9o8) 6I Misc. 490, 115 N.Y.
Supp. 545; Bothin v. Calif. Title Ins. and Trust Co. (i9o8) 153 Cal. 718, 96 Pac.
5oo; Foehrenbachv. German-American Title and Trust Co., supra.
In German-American Title and Trust Co. v. Citizens Trust and Surety Co.
(1899), 19o Pa. St. 247, 42 At. 682, a bond guaranteed the completion of certain
buildings under a contract. Advances had been made for building operations, the
consideration being the conveyance of ground rents on the land to be improved.
The principle of indemnity was applied limiting the damages to the actual loss
in the val ue of the ground rents; the loss being the difference in the market
value of the ground rents if the buildings had been completed, and their value
with the buildings in their incompleted state. And only the person named as the
insured in a policy can sue thereon, Bothin v. Calif. Title Ins. and Trust Co.,
supra.
'Empire Development Co. v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co. (I918) 225 N.Y.
53, 121 N.E. 468.
' Under proper allegations such losses may be proven as are naturally and
legally the consequences presumably resulting from the injury. Glyn v. Title
Guaranteeand Trust Co. (io9) 132 App. Div. 859, 117 N.Y. Supp. 424. And see
Taylor v. N.J. Title Guarantee and Trust Co. (igoz) 68 N.J.L. 74, 52 Atl. 281.
' (i9o6) 74 C.C.A. 127, 142 Fcd. 957.
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sustain by reason of existing defects in his interest. A receiver was
appointed for the estate of the decedent under which the plaintiff's
assignors were remaindermen, who thereupon collected the amount
due under that part of the mortgage held by the plaintiff and satisfied
the same to that extent. Plaintiff contended that the legal title to that
portion of the mortgage in which he had an interest having been transferred, his interest in the mortgage had been impaired. It was held,
however, that by the payment to the receiver, the plaintiff's right in the
mortgage was simply tiransferred to the funds in the hands of the receiver; and further, that no evidence having been produced to show
that that fund had been impaired the action failed for lack of any
30
showing of loss or damage.2 9 Also in Wheeler v. Equitable Trust Co.,
wherein the insurer's contract to indemnify the plaintiff, a mortgagee,
against loss or damage, also embodied an apparent "guaranty" to complete certain buildings (the subject of the mortgage) according to
plans mentioned, it was held that the contract was entire and one
wholly of indemnity, and not two contracts, one of indemnity and one
of guaranty,"' and that plaintiff could not show that the houses were not
built in accordance with the plans or specifications, without proof of
some actual loss.
'See Pallisterv. Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. (igo8), 61 Misc. 490, 115 N.Y. Supp.
545, where the court upheld the contention by the defendant company that the
plaintiff had suffered no loss or damage by reason of the omission of certain
assessments not found in the schedule of exceptions attached to the policy. In that
case the plaintiff contracted for the purchase of certain property subject to all
taxes and assessments then existing as liens thereon, and thereafter applied for
and received a policy insuring his title, excepting certain liens and assessments.
Plaintiff was unable to sell his right in the property due to the disclosure of outstanding unpaid assessments which were not contained in the policy's schedule of
excepted incumbrances. The court held-in a decision which will surely never be
noted for strength-that since, under the original contract of purchase the plaintiff would have been obliged to take title, regardless of the number of tax and
assessment liens against the property, the failure of the defendant to discover
these unknown assessments occasioned the plaintiff no loss; and that since the
policy was one of strict indemnity the insured could not recover (if at all)
until he had paid the assessments. But see contra the strong case of Empire
Developnent Co. v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co. (1918) 225 N.Y. 53, 121 N.E.
468.
(1903) 206 Pa. St. 428, 55 Atd. lO65.
"The distinction, between contracts of indemnity and those of guaranty is
elementary. It was very important in this case that the contract was held to have
been one of indemnity only, for, had the contract been construed as being divisible
and one part thereof a contract of guaranty, plaintiff, although he had lost nothing,
would have had a right to recover. A contract of title insurance is not one of
guaranty. See also, Equity Trust Co. v. _lEtna Indemnity Co. (19o9) 168 Fed.
433.
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And it follows from the very terms of such contracts that the loss
or damage, if any, must be by reason of incumbrances against which
the insurer agreed to be bound. 2 Thus in Wheeler v. Real Estate
Title Ins. &Trust Co.,33 due to the fact that a building was then in
process of erection on the premises, the policy excepted from its scope,
liability for "unmarketability by reason of the possibility of mechanics'
liens and municipal liens," but by express provision this limitation
on its liability was not to extend to "actual losses by reason of such
liens." 34 The policy was executed in 1888, and the work for which
claims were filed was not done until 189i. It was very properly held
that the "possibility" of liens within the meaning of the exception was
a present possibility, and that such claims not having been a charge
on the property at the date of the policy they could create no cause
of action under it, the intent of the parties being to insure against
liens, the rights to which were already inchoate at the date of the policy.
The term "loss" is relative" and what the word means is to be
measured by the standard accepted between the parties.
Thus in
Foehrenbach v. Gernan-American Title & Trust Co.," plaintiff was
insured as to his title in certain property which seemed, under the
terms of a will, to vest entirely in himself. In an action of partition
it was judicially determined that the will gave him no rights but that
he took merely as an heir of the deceased devisee under the will, lessening his interest in the property one-half. Action being brought on the
policy, it was contended in defense that the insured had lost nothing
because he never did, in, fact, have title to the entire interest, and that
'Broadway Realty Co. v. Lawyers' Title Ins. and Trust Co. (1916) 171 App.
123 N.E. 754; Taylor
v. N.J. Title Guarantee etc. Co. (19o2) 68 N.J.L. 74, 52 At. 281. In Empire
Development Ca. v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co. (1918) 225 N.Y. 53, 121 N.E.
468, the term "loss or damage" was construed to cover the payment by the insured of assessments against the property, which had not been excepted from the
policy due to the insured's promise to pay the same and have them canceled;
but it was further held that under the circumstances the defendant was entitled
to a reformation of the policy to relieve it from the purposely omitted assessment.
(1894) 16o Pa. St. 408, 28 At. 849.
"The reason for the insurer doing this was that the insured was a mortgagee
and that the security was such that both the liens and the mortgage irndebtedness
could have complete satisfaction therefrom, however, the existence of the liens
were a possible obstacle to a sale by the insured of his, interest and this risk the
insurer was unwilling to assume.
'Foehrenbach v. German-Americai Title:and Trust Co. :(1907) 217 Pa. St.
331, 66 Atl. 561, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 465.
' Ehmer v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co. (1898) 156 N.Y. 1o, 50 N.E. 420;
Empire Development Co. v. Title Guaranteeand Trust Co. (1918) 225 N.Y. 53, 121
N.E. 468. See also Kentucky Title Co. v. Hail (1927) 219 Ky. 256, 292 SAV. 817.
5.Note 35, suPra.
..
.....

Div. 792, I57 N.Y. Supp. io88, reversed in 226 N.Y. 335,
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therefore he could not be said to have lost that which he had never
owned .3 The court admitted the logic of this argument but also pointed
out that that had been the very reason why the insurance had been procured; and it was held that the estate or interest of the insured which
was 'covered by the policy having been that of an owner in fee of the
entire property, any defect in title which reduced his interest below
that point was that much loss or damage for which he was entitled to
be indemnified.
There can be no sound reason for any distinction to be made between the rights of a present or a prospective owner who apply for
title insurance, to recover on their contracts. Relief of mind to an
owner, obtained through that means, is as desirable as the same assurance to a mortgagee or to one intending to purchase. The only purpose an owner or mortgdgee has in seeking insurance of this kind is
to avoid a possible claim against himself, and to remove all fear of
uncertainty in the validity of his title or interest. To say, then, that
when a defect subsequently develops he has lost nothing-because he
never had anything-and, therefore, can recover nothing, is to misinterpret and ignore the original intention of both the insured and the
insurer. Such a contract should be enforced as was done in the
Foehrenbach and the Empire Development Co. cases.

Decisions to

the contrary, as in the Pallister case, if universal, would restrict the
business of title insurance companies to those cases only where an intending purchaser or mortgagee would demand this form of assurance as to the quality of his prospective interest.
The amount recoverable in any given case depends wholly upon the
terms of the contract and upon the facts surrounding and determining
the loss. Ordinarily liability cannot exceed the amount specified in
the policy,3" nor, in keeping with its nature-as a contract of strict
' Contentions similar to this were also made in the cases of Pallister v. Title
Ins. Co. of N.Y. and Empire Development Co. v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co.
note 29, supra. In Minnesota Title Ins. and Trust Co. v. Drexel (note 25, supra)
it was contended that an insured mortgagee who had bid in and purchased the
mortgaged property on the foreclosure sale for the full amount of his mortgage
debt, thereby himself assumed the burden of paying off certain mechanics' liens
which were in existence prior to but not excepted from the terms of the policy.
A condition of the policy provided that payment or satisfaction of the mortgage
indebtedness, except by foreclosure, should annul the policy. The court, overruling defendant's contention, pointed out that the case fell directly within the
exception mentioned in the condition, and held that the mortgagee had a right to
look to the defendant for the extinguishment of all liens upon the property which
existed at the date of the policy, and to gauge his bid on the assumption that the
insurer would discharge its obligation in that regard.
'But in Quigley v. St. Paul Title Ins. and Trust Co. (1895) 6o Minn. 275, 62
N.W. 287, where under the terms of the policy, the insurer had the option, in case
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indemnity-can recovery under it be for more than the actual loss. 4 "

However, this would not preclude the parties from fixing the measure
of damages as between themselves in case of a loss, and the courts
4 1
will hold the parties bound by any provisions purporting to do this.
The policies themselves generally define what shall constitute a loss,
and their more common provisions, either as conditions precedent, or
as exceptions from liability, declare a loss to arise where the insured
has been evicted under a paramount title or under a judgment of a
competent court; where in such a court the existence of a lien or
incumbrance has been declared to exist; where, on a sale or an attempted sale, the property proves to be unmarketable from a defect in
42
title; or where, because of some defect, a mortgage loan has failed.
of suit against the property insured, to defend the same or pay the claim, it was
held that the limitation in the policy as to the extent of the insurance, did not
apply where the insurer did in fact undertake the defense of such a suit but failed
to exercise proper care in its conduct, allowing the period of redemption to expire without notifying the insured as to its intention so to do. The insurer was
held liable for the total loss sustained by the insured which was held to be the
value of the property at the time of its sale upon foreclosure. In Equity Trust
Co. v. Aetna Indemnity Co. (1gog) 168 Fed. 433, plaintiff contracted to insure the
title of certain mortgages who furnished money to be used in building sixty-two
houses on land owned by the builder, and also the titles of purchasers of such
houses, protecting them from defaults of the owner in the building operations
and from liens. The owner, with defendant as surety, executed a bond to plaintiff
to indemnify it against any policies it might issue, including any sums it might
advance for material and labor for the completion of the buildings. Defendant
knew that plaintiff was to handle and pay out the fund used in the entire building
operations, and that sub-contracts had been let for parts of the work covering all
of the houses. It was held that defendant's liability was not restricted to losses
incurred by plaintiff on the particular houses the owners of which had received
policies from defendant, but extended to the entire operation which it had contracted to see completed.
,0 See cases cited in note 25 supra.
See De Wyckoff v. Fidelity Union Trust Co. (922) 97 N.J.L. 233, 116 Atl.
714.

2

The Chicago Title and Trust Co. by its policy, obligates itself to do two things
for the protection of the insured: (I) defend suits against the title at its own
expense, and (2) to pay adverse judgments therein rendered. Its policy expressly
exempts the insurer from any liability for any loss occasioned by the refusal of
any party to carry out any contract to purchase, lease, or loan money, on the
estate or interest guaranteed. The policy of the Title Guarantee & Trust Co. of
New York (see Richards, Ins. Law, 3rd ed. §465) has a further obligation incorporated in its list of stipulations, to the effect that if the insured contracts
to sell or if he negotiates a loan, and the title is refused, the insurer will test
the validity of the title in court, at its own expense, and, if defeated, will either
pay damages because of such refusal, take the property at the contract price where
the insured has contracted to sell it, or to make the loan where he has negotiated
a loan. The policy of .the Illinois -company mentioned above seems to insure
against nothing that is not of record. See note 18 supra.
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The rights of the parties respecting the loss recoverable are determined as of the date the cause of action arises. 43 Thus where the insured contracted for the sale of the property and performance was refused by the vendee because of absence of title in the insured vendor,
it was held that the measure of the loss or damage was the value of
the property affected as of the date of the contract of sale by the
insured and that it was not to be measured by its value as of the
44
time of the making of the guarantee.
Contracts of title insurance are to be construed by the same rules
which govern ordinary insurance contracts. 45 There must, of course,
be no question as to whether the contract is one of insurance before
such rules of interpretation will apply.46 Thus in Purcell v. Land
'Purcell v. Land Title Guarantee Co. (1902) 94 Mo. App. 5, 67 S.W. 726.
where it was stated that title insurance was not intended to indemnify merely
against incumbrances, but rather against the assertion of such or other claims
against the property. See also Quigley v. St. Paul Title Ins. and Trust Co.
(i895) 6o Minn. 275, 62 N.W. 287.
In' California, by statute, the cause of action is not deemed to have accrued
until the discovery of the loss or damage suffered by the aggrieved party. §339

Code Civ. Proc.
"Flockhart Foun.dry Co. v. Fidelity Union Trust Co. (1926) N.J., 132 Atl. 493.
The measure of damages is not what an insured has paid for property lost through
defects but rather its market value at date of loss; not the cost price but the'
selling price governs. Kentucky Title Co. v. Hail, (1927) 219 Ky. 256, 292 S.W.
817.
. See Joyce, Law of Ins. (2nd ed. 1917) §2o6c. Minnesota Title Ins. Co. v.
Drexel (1895) 36 U.S. App. 50, 17 C.C.A. 56, 7o Fed. 194; Trenton Potteries Co.
v. Title GOuarantee and Trust Co. (1900) 5o App. Div. 49o, 64 N.Y. Supp. 1I6.

See Barton v. West Jersey Title Guaranty Co. (1899) 64 N.J.L. 24, 44 Atl. 871,
holding that an action on a policy of title insurance to be subject to the same rules
of pleading as though the action were brought on a covenant of warranty. See
also, Wheeler v. Real Estate Title Ins. and Trust Co. ('894) 16o Pa. St. 4o8, 28
Atl. 849; and Place v. St. Paul Title Ins. and Truest Co. (1897) 67 Minn. 126, 69
N.W. 7o6, 64 Am. St. Rep. 404.
'Purcell v. Land Title Guarantee Co. (1902) 94 Mo. App. 5, 67 S.W. 726.
And in Title Ins. and Trust Co. v. City of Los Angeles (923) 6i Cal. App. 232,
214 Pac. 667, a certificate by a title insurance company stating that after examination of the records, the company "hereby guarantees" the title to the property mentioned to be in a certain party, was held to be a contract of title insurance.
"It seems to be well settled that these contracts are essentially those of insurance
where the companies engage in the business for profit and where the terms of
the contract itself closely resemble the essential elements of an insurance contract,
so that the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the rules of construction applicable to insurance rather than by the rule of strictissimi juris,
which determines the rights of ordinary guarantors or sureties without pecuniary
consideration." Joyce, Law of Ins. (2nd ed. 1917) §§339 and 339g.
A contract to indemnify against loss through defects in title to real estate is
an insurance contract. Hager v. Keptucky Title Co. (19.5) i19j.Ky. 85o,.85 S.W.
183.
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Title Guarantee Co.47 a certificate of title which recited that "said

guarantor shall not be liable for damages" to exceed a certain sum, and
would defend as to every claim "adverse to the title hereby guaranteed," and had further provisions respecting partial losses of the property and the rights of subrogation in case "the guarantor shall at any
time pay any claim under this certificate and guaranty," was held to
be a contract of title insurance, and was not rendered a mere guaranty
of the correctness of the certificate 8 by the additional provision wherein
the company guaranteed the certificate to be correct."
The whole contract of insurance must be taken into consideration
when it is being construed, and the intention of the parties determined
therefrom, and the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract can be shown to clear up doubts as to this intention. 0 But
under the rule that all prior negotiations are to be considered merged
in the written contract, it was held in Banes v. New Jersey Title Guarantee & Trust Co.,5 1 that parol evidence was properly excluded when
offered to show the circumstances under which a policy was issued
and that it was intended by the parties to insure title in the insured
but not against diminution of his estate or interest.52

And the rule

applicable to insurance agents generally, as to the power of waiver of
conditions, applies as well to agents of title insurance companies. Accordingly, where the insurer's agent told insured that a certain incumbrance, pointed out to him by the insured, amounted to nothing
and needed no attention, and this was relied upon by the insured, this
was held to be a waiver by the insurer of a condition in the policy
requiring notice of any adverse claims.5
' Supra note 46.
"In California, by statute (§453v, Civ. Code) a policy of title insurance is declared to be any written instrument purporting to show the title to real property,
or information relative thereto, which shall in express terms purport to insure or
guarantee such title or the correctness of such information. Cf. Whitaker v.
Title Ins. and Trust Co. (I92I) 186 Cal. 432, 199 Pac. 528.

" Such certificate was declared to be, in effect, only a corollary of the guaranty
of title.
' See Trenton Potteries Co. v. Title Guaranteeand Trust Co. (1903) 176 N.Y.
65, 68 N.E. 132, in which a single policy insured the title to five separate properties, against loss through defects in title existhig at the date of the policy. Action
having been brought on the policy for a loss resulting from a defect existing prior
to the date of the policy, it was held permissible to show that the issuance

of the policy had been postponed until title. to the-fifth parcel had been perfected
by a legal proceeding, and that in executing the policy. the date thereof, was, by
mistake, fixed as that of the date on which. the deed.to:the last tract was obtained
by the insured; reformation was allowed.
r'(i9o6) 74 C.C.A. 125, 42 Fed. 957.
'See Whitaker v. Title Ins..&. Trust Co. -1921) i86 Cal. 432, 199 Pac. 528,
and-Kentucky Title Go. v. Hail (1927) 219 Ky. 256; 9z S.W. 817.
'Purcell v. Land Title Guarantee Co. (1902) 94 Mo. App. 5, 67 S.W. 726.
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Likewise as to warranties and conditions, the general principles of
insurance law are applicable. 54 For example, following the general doctrine of warranties as to insurance applications, it was held in Stensgaard v. St. Paul Real Estate Insurance Coubpany,5 5 that where the
policy provided that an untrue answer to any question contained in the
application should avoid the policy, the answers amounted, in effect,
to a warranty, and that thus the matter of their materiality was not
open. Again, in a very recent case, where the policy provided that
any untrue statement by the insured, or suppression of a material fact
should avoid the policy, it was held that the suppression by the insured
of the fact that his grantor, at the time of executing the deed to the
insured, was of unsound mind and that the deed was fraudulently procured, voided the policy.5" By statute, in some states, all statements, in
the absence of fraud, are deemed to be representations merely and not
warranties, thus changing the nature and consequently the effect, in
those jurisdictions, of false statements in insurance applications. 57 A
warranty may, of course, be waived, and such was the holding in Quigley v. St. Paid Title Insurance and Trust Company;" wherein the insured
falsely (but apparently not wilfully) stated in his application that there
were no incumbrances against the property when in truth there existed
certain mechanics' liens thereon. It appeared from a recital in the
policy59 that defendant had full knowledge of the existence of the said
liens. Applying a well-known principle of law, applicable to contracts
of insurance, the court held that by issuing the policy knowing the war' Stensgaard v. St. Paul Real Estate Title Ins. Co. (1892) 50 Min". 429, 52
N.W. 91o, 17 L.R.A. 575. See 3 Cooley, Briefs on Ins. (1905) p. 2446.
Ibid. In this case one of the questions in the application was as to the last
price paid for'the property, and the answer was "$ii,OOO." It appeared that
though the deed recited a consideration of that amount, the transaction was really
a trade of mining stock of little or no value and $3,ooo in cash. It was held that
the question called for the actual and not the nominal price, and the answer being
false and its materiality not being open to question, it amounted to a warranty
and voided the policy.
' Rosenblatt v. Louisville Title Co. (1927) 218 Ky. 714, 292 S.W. 333. To the
same effect see Clarke v. Massachusetts Title Ins. Co. (1921) 237 Mass. 55, 129
N.E. 376.
' As to whether statements in guaranty contracts generally are representations
or warranties see 3 Joyce, Law of Ins. (2nd ed. 1917) §20o2a (e). See also
Richards, Ins. Law (3rd ed.) pp. 683-685, for list of statutes changing nature of
false statements from warranties to representations.
' (1895) 6o Minn. 275, 62 N.W. 287.
" This recital was an incorporation, by reference of a recorded agreement between the mortgagor of the property and a third person wlich purported to give
said third person a mechanic's or maierial-rman;s lien lupon t.he property insured:
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ranted representations to be false, the defendant waived them, and that
it could not be heard to say that it intended to issue and deliver, not a
valid policy, but a worthless contractY'
Where there are conditions to be performed before a right of action
accrues under a policy of title insurance the courts will give them full
effect, unless it can be shown either that the conditions were not intended to apply,6 1 as where, if interpreted literally, the insured would
be required to perpetrate a fraud,6 2 or that they were waived. Thus
where recovery on a policy was conditioned upon the actual eviction
of the insured from the premises, it was held, in Barton v. West Jersey
Title Guaranty Company,0 ' that a complaint which averred that a lawful right and title to part of the property was claimed by a third party
and that plaintiff was evicted under an adverse title was bad on demurrer in that it failed to describe an entry or disturbance by paramount title. Though this may be a rather far-fetched decision, it
shows the extent to which courts will go in upholding reasonable conditions. Further, where a condition provides as to the manner in which
losses under the policy shall be ascertained, there must be a specific
averment in the complaint setting out that the loss was consequent upon
one or more of certain causes of loss against which the policy guaran'To the same effect see McLoughlin v. Bridgeport Land & Title Co. (1923)
99 Conn. 134, 121 Atl. 175.
'" For example, where an insured, by total absence of title was at no time able
to acquire possession, the condition requiring the showing of an eviction to
entitle him to recover under the policy was held not to apply. Place v. St. Paul
Title Ins. & Trtst Co., quoted infra note 62; Kentucky Title Co. v. Hail (1927)
219 Ky. 256, 292 S.W. 817. So, also, the fact that one surrenders the possession
of property, the title to which has been insured, upon the rendition of an adverse
decree, without watiting to be expelled from the property does not deprive him
of his right of action against the insurer. Foehrenbach v. Germian-Ainerican Title
& Trust Co. (1907) 217 Pa. St. 331, 66 Atl. 551, 12 L.R.A. (NS) 465, 118 Am.
St. Rep. 916. See 4 Joyce, Law of In.s. (2nd ed. 1917) §2822.
"2In Place v. St. Paul Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1897) 67 Minn. 126, 69 N.W.
706, one of the conditions of the policy delivered to the plaintiff mortgagees was
to the effect that no right of action should accrue unless there had been an actual
eviction under an adverse title insured against, or unless the insured had contracted to sell the pro1ierty and the title had been declared, by a court of last
resort, defective or incumbered by a matter insured against. When the policy was
delivered the mortgagors were neither the owners nor were they in possession of
the property, but the same was then owned and in the occupancy of others. It
was held that the condition did not apply to a case of this kind where the insured
never acquired either possession or a saleable title (see note 61) ; and that to
require the insured to go through the form of complying with the aforementioned
conditions would be to require him to perpetuate a fraud upon an innocent party
and upon the court in which action might be brought.
' (1899) 64 N.J.L. 24, 44 Atl. 871.
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teed indemnity. 64 In a quite recent case6 5 the owner of property, the
title to which was insured to his mortgagee, was given an owner's certificate, reciting that he had paid the premium for such a policy and in
the certificate it was stipulated that if the mortgage should be paid off
and satisfied while plaintiff was the owner, then a new policy would
be executed in his name; it was held that the plaintiff could not sue
on the policy issued to the mortgagee before fulfillment of the conditions mentioned.
As touched upon herein previously 66 a policy of title insurance will
be reformed, upon a proper showing, to conform with the intention
of the parties. The general rules respecting reformation of instruments
generally apply, so that, where the mistake complained of was not
mutual but was solely that of the insurer, reformation will not be de67
creed.
In conclusion, it must be said that, except perhaps in the question of
insurable interest and loss, when apparent owner desires to insure his
title-touched upon in the Empire Developnwnt Company case-there
seems to be no reason to expect that the courts will need to re-state
or devise new rules governing insurances of this kind. The rules now
governing other contracts of insurance, as to fraud, waiver, warranties,
conditions, discharge, etc., are ample in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties.
"' Taylor v. New Jersey Title Guarantee & Trust Co. (19o2) 68 N.J.L. 74.
Atl. 281.
. Cherry v. Peoples Trust Co. (1925) 282 Pa. St. 52, 127 Atl. 320. In Fox
Chase Bank v. Wayne Junction Trust Co. (1917) 258 Pa. St. 272, IOI Atl. 979,
52

under a policy indemnifying a mortagee from loss by reason of the filing of certain
mechanics' liens, a provision requiring the insurer to notify the insurer of any
action or proceeding founded upon any lien, was held not to refer to the filing of
the lien but to the proceedings for its enforcement.
' See notes 32 and 50 supra.
'Kenitcky Title Co. v. Hail (1927) 2I9 Ky. 256, 292 S.V. 817. See also,
Trenton Potteries Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co. (1903) 176 N.Y. 65, 68
N.E. 132; Elmer v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co. (1898) 156 N.Y. 10, 5o N.E. 42o.

